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National system of emergency and civil protection

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National system of emergency and civil protection
OECD workshop on Inter-Agency Crisis Management
Lessons, improvements and challenges after
the 2010 earthquake in Chile
June 28, 2012
Agenda
• Earthquake and tsunami impact.
• Emergency response.
• Lessons learned and main improvements.
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Juan Fernández
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Juan Fernández
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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4
Highway #5
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Highway #5
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Dichato
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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7
Dichato
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Talcahuano
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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9
Santiago
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Concepción
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Main impacts
•
526 fatal losses and 25 people still missing
•
370,000 destroyed/seriously damaged houses (11% of total)
•
79 destroyed hospitals
•
3,049 destroyed and damaged schools
•
1,250,000 children out of school
•
221 destroyed and damaged bridges
•
900 towns and communities affected
•
75% of the population lives in the affected area
•
Total cost estimated at US$ 30 billion (~15% of GDP)
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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System main weaknesses during crisis
•
Basic communication systems were down for more than 12 hours
•
No transportation capabilities available to authorities
•
Confusing and contradictory information was given by different sources
•
Multiple unnecessary decision points in the tsunami alert process and
decisions made based on intuition
•
No special force available specialized in emergency procedures nor
dedicated to help in initial evaluation of damages
•
Heavy looting begun after the earthquake
•
Disorganized war room dynamic:
•
Unrestricted access
•
Everybody sitting around the same table randomly
•
Press with direct access to the room
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Agenda
• Earthquake and tsunami impact.
• Emergency response.
• Lessons learned and main improvements.
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Emergency committee
•
Assumed a role that ONEMI was not prepared
to assume (e.g. food supply, ONEMI building)
•
Coordination role within the Government and
with private and non-profit sectors.
•
Information gathering—one of the main
challenges for good decision making.
•
No pre-existing organizational structure—lack
of rules and protocols.
•
Staffed with people from different government
services, from the armed forces and the
private sector.
•
Help overcome weak organizational, people
and financial capabilities at the local level.
 Unintended consequences : flexibility, creativity
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Government response organized in 3 stages
Emergency committee main tasks
More than US$ 320 million in emergency response
12,500 beds, 125,000 blankets, 60,000 mattresses
80,000 emergency housing solutions
3 million cubic meters of debris
10 million daily servings of food and water
Public utilities recovery (sewage, drinking water,
electricity…)
Coordinated emergency employment to more
than 19,000 people
Building deconstruction and demolition
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Agenda
• Earthquake and tsunami impact.
• Emergency response.
• Lessons learned and main improvements.
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Some things that worked well
Chile’s coastal population
have a very good
understanding of the need
to evacuate in the event of
any big earthquake
Population
knowledge
Lack of fires
Chile’s construction norm
and developers being
responsible for 10 years
provided a civil
infrastructure that was able
to protect Chilean citizens
overall
Robust civil
infrastructure
Chile’s energy network shuts
down automatically in the
event of any major
earthquake
18
a. Improve ONEMI’s response and civil protection
capabilities
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Main issues identified at ONEMI
Organizat.
structure
Process
Key issues identified
a
There is no clear communications protocol between ONEMI-SHOA-SSN.
b
Lack of predefined check-list of what needs to be done at each point in time and
no standardized evacuation protocol in case of Tsunamis
c
Evacuations take at least 35 min to be triggered and no mass communication
channels are used to inform the population
d
There is no clear chain of command from National to Comunal level
e
Too many advisors in the crisis committee that are not efficiently organized to
address issues; decisions made based on intuition not technical expertise or
Implication
Define processes and
protocols that
maximize efficiency
and effectiveness in
crisis response
Set up structure
that facilitates crisis
management
Talent
Infrastructure
People
preparedness
protocols
f
People in the Civil Protection network do not clearly know their roles
g
There is no ongoing assessment of emergency procedures knowledge
h
Lack of robust telecommunication platforms among SHOA-ONEMI headquarterONEMI regional-SSN
i
Absence of seismic sensors to monitor activity in real-time
j
Absence of transportation capabilities available for authorities
k
Key positions at national, regional and local level are not appropriately staffed
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Ensure each
individual knows
what to do during
a crisis
Get the
appropriate
resources
in place
Place the right
human resources
in the right place
20
36 opportunities for improvement across 5 dimensions
Are the processes
for crisis
management
effective?
Does each
individual
know what
to do during
a crisis?
Infrastructure
Process
Do we have the
appropriate
resources in
place?
Organizational
structure for
emergency
operations
Preparedness
Talent
Do we have the
right human
resources in
the right place?
Do we have an organizational structure that
facilitates crisis management and ensures
efficient use of resources?
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Most of the initiatives are neither cost nor time
intensive
Qualitative assessment of initiatives as a single unit
15
0m
Process
Infrastructure
Preparedness
Talent
2
21 16
6 34 18 36
17 19 27
Org. structure for
emergency ops.
5
Time to implement
13 12
11
4
6m
8
32
12m
24m
30
14
10
~50% of the initiatives
are zero cost, but require
appropriate
management
24
54m
2.000
1.500
500
Cost (CH$ MM)
100
0
Operational and up front expenses expected for 2011
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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Example of detailed process analysis and redesign
Revised Detection process – End State
Actual process
Police, fire
fighters
Inform
earthquake
ONEMIs
regionales
Inform
earthquake
ONEMI
national
a1
Answer
questions
a2
Answer
questions
Map incident a3
by calling
adjacent
regions
a5
Formal process
Informal process
a4
First
Earthquake
assessment
Require
quake report
SSN
a15
Asses if
earthquake is > 7
Merc / 20 sec
Feel the
earthquake
▪
▪
Receive
reports
a11
a10
Redundancy: either SHOA,
ONEMI or SSN can generate
reports if necessary, as
opposed to only SSN
a14
n6
Receive
reports and
acknowledge
them
a9
Require
Tsunami
report
Require
quake report
Collects data
23
Yes
a7
SHOA
Coastal
community
a8
Bigger
than 5
Merc.?
a6
Official
Tsunami
report
Official
Earthquake
report
a12
a13
Detection is done
automatically and
precisely with
sensors
n1
Sensors detect
earthquake
a16
n7
Feel the
earthquake
Input into
Tsunami
forecast table
n2
Bigger
than X?
n4
Yes
Asses if
earthquake is > 7
Merc / 20 sec
n5
Official
Tsunami report
Official
Earthquake
report
n3
n8
Earthquake report is
generated automatically
by the system
Earthquakes and Tsunamis detected by sensors and communicated to all stakeholders automatically
- Total steps reduced from 11 to 5 steps, resulting in a ~90% time reduction (from ~25-30 min to ~ 2 min)
Back – up processes incorporated so if any of the agencies fail the others can take care of it
SOURCE: McKinsey & Co
b. From disaster management to disaster risk
reduction
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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International consultancies and agreements
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
United Nations (UN)
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
California Emergency Management Agency (CAL EMA)
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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National system of emergency and civil protection
Main Challenge
Create and establish a national system of emergency and civil protection, including a risk
reduction strategy with civil society playing a central role.
Some guiding principles





Multisectorial approach.
Central government get involves only subsidiarily.
Minimize discretionary decision making.
Relience on existing capabilities.
Focus on prevention rather than response.
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
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National system of emergency and civil protection
Clearly defined
emergency levels
Emergency operations
committee
Formal role for the
armed forces
•
Level 1—can be
addressed with
resources available at
the local level.
•
•
To get involved in
emergency prevention
and preparedness, and
in humanitarian aid.
•
Level 2—can not be
addressed at the local
level.
•
Involvment must be
required by emergency
operations committes.
•
First response task
force.
•
•
Defined by the
President.
•
•
Clear rules for each
level.
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Non-permanent bodies at
the local and national
level to plan, coordinate
and direct actions to
respond to an emergency.
Deployment of public
resources, rely on armed
forces for humanitarian
aid support.
Receive technical support
from the Agency.
27
National system of emergency and civil protection
National Agency of
Civil Protection
National Council of
Civil Protection
National Civil
Protection Strategy
National Fund of Civil
Protection
•
•
Advisory body
integrated by members
of different sectors.
•
Defines priorities and
guiding principles for
risk reduction and
preparedness.
•
•
Public, private and civil
society members.
•
Must be revised at least
every 5 years.
•
Complemented by
national plans of
different sectors.
•
Replicated at the local
level.
•
Promote and
implement prevention
and emergency
response actions.
Coordination and
advisory role.
•
•
Descentralized
organization.
•
Replaces ONEMI.
•
Help Minister of the
Interior developing the
National Civil Protection
Strategy.
Replicated at local level.
Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
To secure a long-term
source of financing for
public and private
prevention activities
and initiatives.
28
Challenges going forward
▪
Maintain a sense of urgency even a long time after the earthquake has
happened.
▪
Have capable and motivated people in key positions and hold them
accountable for the quality of their work when risks are latent.
▪
See Civil Protection as a country wide issue that requires coordination and
cooperation among multiple agencies (ministers, armed forces, private
companies, etc)
▪
Keep all those who would be involved in crisis management well trained and
informed.
▪
Secure funding to support the different initiatives and the human resources
responsible for them in the long term.
▪
Long term commitment of every agency involved to push this effort forward.
29
Gracias.
30
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